In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press (2008)

Authors
Peter Godfrey-Smith
University of Sydney
Abstract
The main message of the paper is that there is a disconnect between what many philosophers of mind think of as the scientific practice of reductive or reductionist explanation, and what the most relevant scientific work is actually like. I will sketch what I see as a better view, drawing on various ideas in recent philosophy of science. I then import these ideas into the philosophy of mind, to see what difference they make.1 At the end of the paper I address a possible objection: the familiar package of ideas I reject in the philosophy of science should not be lightly discarded, because other popular views on fundamental issues depend on positions that I want to reject. I reply that those apparently attractive further ideas are not worth holding onto
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References found in this work BETA

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
Thinking About Mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
The Scientific Image.C. Van Fraassen Bas - 1980 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Capacities.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - In Dena Shottenkirk & Steven Gouveia (eds.), Perception, Cognition, and Aesthetics. London: Routledge. pp. 137 - 169.
Whewell’s Hylomorphism as a Metaphorical Explanation for How Mind and World Merge.Ragnar Van Der Merwe - forthcoming - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:DOI: 10.1007/s10838-021-09595-x.
Interventionism and the Exclusion Problem.Yasmin Bassi - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Warwick

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