Triviality arguments against functionalism

Philosophical Studies 145 (2):273 - 295 (2009)
Abstract
“Triviality arguments” against functionalism in the philosophy of mind hold that the claim that some complex physical system exhibits a given functional organization is either trivial or has much less content than is usually supposed. I survey several earlier arguments of this kind, and present a new one that overcomes some limitations in the earlier arguments. Resisting triviality arguments is possible, but requires functionalists to revise popular views about the “autonomy” of functional description.
Keywords Functionalism  Mind  Computation  Realization  Causal role
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9231-3
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References found in this work BETA
Thinking About Mechanisms.Peter K. Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Minds and Machines.Hilary Putnam - 1960 - In Sidney Hook (ed.), Journal of Symbolic Logic. New York University Press. pp. 57-80.

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Citations of this work BETA
Computation, Implementation, Cognition.Oron Shagrir - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):137-148.
Against Structuralist Theories of Computational Implementation.Michael Rescorla - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):681-707.
A Simplicity Criterion for Physical Computation.Tyler Millhouse - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx046.
Does Functionalism Entail Extended Mind?Kengo Miyazono - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3523-3541.

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