Triviality arguments against functionalism

Philosophical Studies 145 (2):273 - 295 (2009)
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Abstract

“Triviality arguments” against functionalism in the philosophy of mind hold that the claim that some complex physical system exhibits a given functional organization is either trivial or has much less content than is usually supposed. I survey several earlier arguments of this kind, and present a new one that overcomes some limitations in the earlier arguments. Resisting triviality arguments is possible, but requires functionalists to revise popular views about the “autonomy” of functional description.

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Citations of this work

Computation in physical systems.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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References found in this work

Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Troubles with functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.
Minds and Machines.Hilary Putnam - 1960 - In Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions Of Mind: A Symposium. NY: NEW YORK University Press. pp. 138-164.

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