Philosophical Studies 145 (2):273 - 295 (2009)
“Triviality arguments” against functionalism in the philosophy of mind hold that the claim that some complex physical system exhibits a given functional organization is either trivial or has much less content than is usually supposed. I survey several earlier arguments of this kind, and present a new one that overcomes some limitations in the earlier arguments. Resisting triviality arguments is possible, but requires functionalists to revise popular views about the “autonomy” of functional description.
|Keywords||Functionalism Mind Computation Realization Causal role|
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Functions in Jurisprudential Methodology.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):447-456.
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