Informal Logic 22 (1) (2002)

G. C. Goddu
University of Richmond
In this paper I argue that the debate over the purported distinction between deductive and inductive arguments can be bypassed because making the distinction is unnecessary for successfully evaluating arguments. I provide a foundation for doing logic that makes no appeal to the distinction and still performs all the relevant tasks required of an analysis of arguments. I also reply to objections to the view that we can dispense with the distinction. Finally, I conclude that the distinction between inductive and deductive arguments is not one of the most important and fundamental ideas in logic, but rather is unnecessary
Keywords argument, deductive, inductive, adequacy, reasoning
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References found in this work BETA

Introduction to Logic.Nicholas Rescher - 1964 - New York: St. Martin's Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Enthymematic Parsimony.Fabio Paglieri & John Woods - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):461 - 501.
Advice on Abductive Logic.Dov Gabbay & John Woods - 2006 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 14 (2):189-219.
Appeals to Considerations.David Hitchcock - 2013 - Informal Logic 33 (2):195-237.
A Note on Implicit Premisses.David Hitchcock - 2002 - Informal Logic 22 (2).

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