Ratio 16 (1):16-32 (2003)
AbstractAccording to the prevailing sentiment, changing the past is logically impossible. The prevailing sentiment is wrong. In this paper, I argue that the claim that changing the past entails a contradiction ultimately rests upon an empirical assumption, and so the conclusion that changing the past is logically impossible is to be resisted. I then present and discuss a model of time which drops the empirical assumption and coherently models changing the past. Finally, I defend the model, and changing the past, against objections.
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Time Travel and the Immutability of the Past within B-Theoretical Models.Giacomo Andreoletti & Giuliano Torrengo - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):1011-1021.
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