Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):588-603 (2013)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Joint action is a growing field of research, spanning across the cognitive, behavioral, and brain sciences as well as receiving considerable attention amongst philosophers. I argue that there has been a significant oversight within this field concerning the possibility that many joint actions are driven, at least in part, by agents' social motivations rather than merely by their shared intentions. Social motivations are not directly related to the (joint) target goal of the action. Instead, when agents are mutually socially motivated in joint action this is because they find acting with others rewarding in its own right. Moreover the involvement of social motivation in joint action typically enables individuals to achieve the long-term benefits associated with being part of a social bond. I argue that taking social motivations into account better prepares us for explaining a broader range of joint actions, including those that are of an antagonistic, competitive, or explorative character. Finally, I show that recognizing the importance of social motivations entails that joint actions (in general) should be understood as having the two primary functions of (1) achieving the intended target outcome of an action, and (2) attaining the benefits related to being part of a social bond
|
Keywords | Joint action shared emotion social motivation |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2013 |
DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2012.670905 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Cognition.Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne & Henrike Moll - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):675-691.
View all 21 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
How Does It Really Feel to Act Together? Shared Emotions and the Phenomenology of We-Agency.Mikko Salmela & Michiru Nagatsu - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):449-470.
How We Fail to Know: Group-Based Ignorance and Collective Epistemic Obligations.Anne Schwenkenbecher - forthcoming - Political Studies:online first.
Joint Actions, Commitments and the Need to Belong.Víctor Fernandez Castro & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2020 - Synthese (8):1-30.
When Affective Relation Weighs More Than the Mug Handle: Investigating Affective Affordances.Marta Caravà & Claudia Scorolli - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
View all 15 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Joint Attention in Joint Action.Anika Fiebich & Shaun Gallagher - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):571-87.
Let’s Pretend!: Children and Joint Action.Deborah Tollefsen - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2012 - In Seemann Axel (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments. MIT Press.
Early Developments in Joint Action.Celia A. Brownell - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):193-211.
Joint Action and Group Action Made Precise.Gabriel Sandu & Raimo Tuomela - 1995 - Synthese 105 (3):319 - 345.
Psychological Research on Joint Action : Theory and Data.Günther Knoblich, Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Natalie Sebanz - unknown
Joint Actions and Group Agents.Philip Pettit & David Schweikard - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):18-39.
Naturalizing Joint Action: A Process-Based Approach.Deborah Tollefsen & Rick Dale - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):385-407.
The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions.Raimo Tuomela - 1995 - Stanford University Press.
Joint Responsibility Without Individual Control: Applying the Explanation Hypothesis.Gunnar Björnsson - 2011 - In Jeroen van den Hoven, Ibo van de Poel & Nicole Vincent (eds.), Moral Responsibility: beyond free will and determinism. Springer.
Joint Attention, Collective Knowledge, and the "We" Perspective.Axel Seemann - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):217 – 230.
Joint Motor Action and Cross-Creature Embodiment.Axel Seemann - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):279-301.
Philosophy and Distributed Artificial Intelligence: The Case of Joint Intention.Raimo Tuomela - 1996 - In N. Jennings & G. O'Hare (eds.), Foundations of Distributed Artificial Intelligence. Wiley.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2012-04-19
Total views
79 ( #146,552 of 2,506,107 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,984 of 2,506,107 )
2012-04-19
Total views
79 ( #146,552 of 2,506,107 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,984 of 2,506,107 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads