Alternative Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2):131–147 (2002)
In this paper, I assume that if we have libertarian freedom, it is located in the power to choose and its exercise. Given this assumption, I then further assume a version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities which states that an agent is morally responsible for his choice only if he could have chosen otherwise. With these assumptions in place, I examine three recent attempts to construct Frankfurt‐style counterexamples to PAP. I argue that all fail to undermine the intuitive plausibility of PAP
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00139
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Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question.Stewart C. Goetz - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):83-105.

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