A priori physicalism, lonely ghosts and cartesian doubt

Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):742-746 (2012)
Authors
Philip Goff
Central European University
Abstract
A zombie is a physical duplicates of a human being which lacks consciousness. A ghost is a phenomenal duplicate of a human being whose nature is exhausted by consciousness. Discussion of zombie arguments, that is anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of zombies, is familiar in the philosophy of mind literature, whilst ghostly arguments, that is, anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of ghosts, are somewhat neglected. In this paper I argue that ghostly arguments have a number of dialectical advantages over zombie arguments. I go onto explain how the conceivability of ghosts is inconsistent with two kinds of a priori physicalism: analytic functionalism and the Australian physicalism of Armstrong and Lewis
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2011.02.007
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References found in this work BETA

Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Laws of Nature.Fred I. Dretske - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (2):248-268.
Functionalism and Qualia.Sydney Shoemaker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.
Reduction of Mind.David Lewis - 1994 - In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 412-431.

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Citations of this work BETA

Are Ghosts Scarier Than Zombies?E. Diaz-Leon - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):747-748.

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