Erkenntnis 81 (4):881-898 (2016)

Authors
Philip Goff
Durham University
Abstract
In the recent metaphysics literature, a number of philosophers have independently endeavoured to marry sparse ontology to abundant truth. The aim is to keep ontological commitments minimal, whilst allowing true sentences to quantify over a vastly greater range of entities than those which they are ontologically committed to. For example, an ontological commitment only to concrete, microscopic simples might be conjoined with a commitment to truths such as ‘There are twenty people working in this building’ and ‘There are prime numbers greater than 5.’ I argue that a significant challenge to this project comes from the philosophy of mind. As Theodore Sider has pointed out, anti-physicalism is consistent with a sparse ontology. However, I will try to show that the premises of the standard anti-physicalist arguments can be used to form an argument to the conclusion that sentences which quantify over subjects of experience ontologically commit us to subjects of experience. Truths about consciousness cannot be bought more cheaply than their superficial grammar suggests.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-015-9773-7
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,321
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Constructing the World.David Chalmers - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The General Truthmaker View of Ontological Commitment.Bradley Rettler - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1405-1425.
Mind-Body, Body-Mind: Two Distinct Problems.Benny Shanon - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):697 – 701.
Emergence and Fundamentality.Elizabeth Barnes - 2012 - Mind 121 (484):873-901.
Beyond Physicalism and Dualism? Putnam’s Pragmatic Pluralism and the Philosophy of Mind.David Ludwig - 2011 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3 (1):245-257.
Fundamental and Derivative Truths.J. R. G. Williams - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):103 - 141.
Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?Colin McGinn - 1989 - Mind 98 (July):349-66.
The Inscrutability of Colour Similarity.Will Davies - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):289-311.
Beyond Physicalism.Daniel D. Hutto - 2000 - John Benjamins.
The Mind-Body Problem at Century's Turn.Jaegwon Kim - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Clarendon Press. pp. 129-152.
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-01-28

Total views
114 ( #87,965 of 2,419,782 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #248,793 of 2,419,782 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes