Grounding, Essence, and the Knowledge Argument

In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument: Then and Now. Cambridge University Press (forthcoming)
Abstract
Few these days dispute that the knowledge argument demonstrates an epistemic gap between the physical facts and the facts about experience. It is much more contentious whether that epistemic gap can be used to demonstrate a metaphysical gap of a kind that is inconsistent with physicalism. In this paper I will explore two attempts to block the inference from an epistemic gap to a metaphysical gap – the first from the phenomenal concept strategy, the second from Russellian monism – and suggest how the proponent of the knowledge argument might respond to each of these challenges. In doing so, I will draw on recent discussions of grounding and essence in the metaphysics literature.
Keywords Grounding  Essence  Fundamentality  Consciousness  Knowledge Argument  Russellian monism  Phenomenal concept strategy  Mind-body problem  The hard problem
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