The Case for Panpsychism

In Prem Saran Satsangi, Anna Margaretha Horatschek & Anand Srivastav, Consciousness Studies in Sciences and Humanities: Eastern and Western Perspectives. Springer Verlag. pp. 55-61 (2024)
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Abstract

Panpsychism is the view that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world. This chapter outlines two major arguments for panpsychism, one in terms of its role in solving the hard problem of consciousness, and two the intrinsic nature argument. It also responds to the worry that panpsychism is too counterintuitive to be true.

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Philip Goff
Durham University

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