Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):237-253 (2012)

Authors
Kienhow Goh
National University of Singapore
Abstract
Recent work on Hume's Theory of Perception has shown that Hume takes the appearance of impressions to vary according to the ideas under which they are subsumed. In this paper, I argue that the vulgar position in the section where he discusses the Inference from Constancy is characterised by an ideal primordial state of mind where impressions are directly encountered without being subsumed under any idea. In particular, impressions which are not subsumed under the idea of a perception do not appear to the mind as impressions. Read in this light, Hume's Inference from Constancy is immune to the difficulties which have commonly been raised against it
Keywords Hume
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DOI 10.3366/jsp.2012.0040
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