Noûs 41 (2):178-203 (2007)

Authors
Sanford Goldberg
Northwestern University
Abstract
Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), I argue that Boghossians argument is better interpreted as pointing to SAIs implications for the na- ture of discursive justification
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00643.x
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References found in this work BETA

Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Individualism and Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.
Content and Self-Knowledge.Paul A. Boghossian - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.
The Structure of Justification.Robert Audi - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning.Mikkel Gerken - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):381-400.
Content Externalism and Brute Logical Error.John M. Collins - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):pp. 549-574.

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