Noûs 41 (2):178-203 (2007)
Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), I argue that Boghossians argument is better interpreted as pointing to SAIs implications for the na- ture of discursive justification
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Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning.Mikkel Gerken - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):381-400.
Critical Study of Goldberg's Relying on Others. [REVIEW]Mikkel Gerken - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):81-88.
Must Differences in Cognitive Value Be Transparent?Sanford Goldberg - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (2):165-187.
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