A causal theory of knowing

Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372 (1967)
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Since Edmund L. Gettier reminded us recently of a certain important inadequacy of the traditional analysis of "S knows that p," several attempts have been made to correct that analysis. In this paper I shall offer still another analysis (or a sketch of an analysis) of "S knows that p," one which will avert Gettier's problem. My concern will be with knowledge of empirical propositions only, since I think that the traditional analysis is adequate for knowledge of nonempirical truths.



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Alvin Goldman
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

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