A consistent way with paradox

Philosophical Studies 144 (3):377 - 389 (2009)
Abstract
Consideration of a paradox originally discovered by John Buridan provides a springboard for a general solution to paradoxes within the Liar family. The solution rests on a philosophical defence of truth-value-gaps and is consistent (non-dialetheist), avoids ‘revenge’ problems, imports no ad hoc assumptions, is not applicable to only a proper subset of the semantic paradoxes and implies no restriction of the expressive capacities of language.
Keywords Paradox  Consistent  Cassationist  Liar  No–no  Buridan
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9215-3
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References found in this work BETA
Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul A. Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Vagueness and Contradiction.Roy A. Sorensen - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
On Referring.P. F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.

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Citations of this work BETA
Semantic Defectiveness and the Liar.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):845-863.
A FailedCassatio? A Note on Valor and Martínez on Goldstein.Laureano Luna - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):383-386.

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