A consistent way with paradox

Philosophical Studies 144 (3):377 - 389 (2009)
Consideration of a paradox originally discovered by John Buridan provides a springboard for a general solution to paradoxes within the Liar family. The solution rests on a philosophical defence of truth-value-gaps and is consistent (non-dialetheist), avoids ‘revenge’ problems, imports no ad hoc assumptions, is not applicable to only a proper subset of the semantic paradoxes and implies no restriction of the expressive capacities of language.
Keywords Paradox  Consistent  Cassationist  Liar  No–no  Buridan
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1975). Outline of a Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.

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Citations of this work BETA
Laureano Luna (2010). A FailedCassatio? A Note on Valor and Martínez on Goldstein. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):383-386.

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