Assertion, Testimony, and the Epistemic Significance of Speech
Logos and Episteme 1 (1):59-65 (2010)
Abstract
Whether or not all assertion counts as testimony, it is argued that not all testimony involves assertion. Since many views in theepistemology of testimony assume that testimony requires assertion, such views are insufficiently general. This result also points to what we might call the epistemic significance of assertion as such.Author's Profile
ISBN(s)
2069-0533
DOI
10.5840/logos-episteme20101121
My notes
Similar books and articles
Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech.Sanford Goldberg - 2015 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Testimony and the Constitutive Norm of Assertion.Casey Rebecca Johnson - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):356-375.
Problems of sincerity.Richard Moran - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):341–361.
Assertion and Expertise.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):509-517.
Take It from Me: The Epistemological Status of Testimony.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):291-308.
Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):492-508.
Aesthetic testimony: What can we learn from others about beauty and art?Aaron Meskin - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):65–91.
The Epistemic Norms of Intra-Scientific Testimony.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):568-595.
Testimony, knowledge, and epistemic goals.Steven L. Reynolds - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):139 - 161.
Putting the Norm of Assertion to Work: the Case of Testimony.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.Sanford Goldberg & David Henderson - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):600 - 617.
Beliefs and Testimony as Social Evidence: Epistemic Egoism, Epistemic Universalism, and Common Consent Arguments.Joshua Rollins - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):78-90.
Analytics
Added to PP
2017-01-11
Downloads
53 (#224,066)
6 months
5 (#154,483)
2017-01-11
Downloads
53 (#224,066)
6 months
5 (#154,483)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Epistemological problems of testimony.Jonathan E. Adler - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Group Testimony: Defending a Reductionist View.Domingos Faria - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (3):283-304.
