Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech

Oxford University Press (2015)

Sanford Goldberg
Northwestern University
Sanford C. Goldberg presents a novel account of the speech act of assertion. He argues that this type of speech act is answerable to an epistemic, context-sensitive norm. On this basis he shows the philosophical importance of assertion for key debates in philosophy of language and mind, epistemology, and ethics
Keywords assertion  epistemology of testimony  norms of assertion  context-sensitivity
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Reprint years 2018
ISBN(s) 9780198732488   9780198801573
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Chapters BETA
Assertion and the Method of Interpretation (Radical and Otherwise)

The aim of this chapter is to argue that the hypothesis that assertion is answerable to a robustly epistemic norm has implications for the nature and method of what Donald Davidson called “the task of radical interpretation.” This is the task of interpreting another’s speech contributions,... see more

Assertion and Assertoric Content

This chapter brings to bear the hypothesis that assertion is answerable to an epistemic norm on further issues pertaining to the interpretation of assertions. By combining some of the results from the previous three chapters, it is argued that this hypothesis can be used to impose some sub... see more

Anonymous Assertion

In this chapter, the hypothesis that assertion is answerable to an epistemic norm is used to illuminate the public nature of assertion. In particular, the aim is to address how the absence of a certain kind of publicness affects assertoric practice. The result is an account of how the anon... see more

Assertion and Disagreement

This chapter develops a problem that arises when thinking about certain contexts in which assertoric practice continues in contexts of what is called systematic peer disagreement. These contexts are a relatively common phenomenon: they obtain when the practice of advancing claims continues... see more

References found in this work BETA

Gricean Quality.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):689-703.

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Citations of this work BETA

Should Have Known.Sanford Goldberg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.
Hedged Assertion.Matthew A. Benton & Peter Van Elswyk - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.

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