Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech
New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2015)
Abstract
Sanford C. Goldberg presents a novel account of the speech act of assertion. He argues that this type of speech act is answerable to an epistemic, context-sensitive norm. On this basis he shows the philosophical importance of assertion for key debates in philosophy of language and mind, epistemology, and ethicsAuthor's Profile
Reprint years
2018
Call number
P107.G63 2015
ISBN(s)
9780198732488 9780198801573 0198801572 9780198732488 9780198801573 0198732481 9780191796708
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Chapters
Assertion and the Method of Interpretation (Radical and Otherwise)
The aim of this chapter is to argue that the hypothesis that assertion is answerable to a robustly epistemic norm has implications for the nature and method of what Donald Davidson called “the task of radical interpretation.” This is the task of interpreting another’s speech contributions,... see more
Assertion and Assertoric Content
This chapter brings to bear the hypothesis that assertion is answerable to an epistemic norm on further issues pertaining to the interpretation of assertions. By combining some of the results from the previous three chapters, it is argued that this hypothesis can be used to impose some sub... see more
Anonymous Assertion
In this chapter, the hypothesis that assertion is answerable to an epistemic norm is used to illuminate the public nature of assertion. In particular, the aim is to address how the absence of a certain kind of publicness affects assertoric practice. The result is an account of how the anon... see more
Assertion and Disagreement
This chapter develops a problem that arises when thinking about certain contexts in which assertoric practice continues in contexts of what is called systematic peer disagreement. These contexts are a relatively common phenomenon: they obtain when the practice of advancing claims continues... see more
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Why assertion and practical reasoning are possibly not governed by the same epistemic norm.Robin McKenna - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (4):457-464.
Putting the Norm of Assertion to Work: the Case of Testimony.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
The Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion.Rachel McKinnon - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):121-135.
Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.
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Citations of this work
Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.
Hedged Assertion.Matthew A. Benton & Peter Van Elswyk - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.
