Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):364-382 (1993)
This paper supports the basic integrity of the folk psychological conception of consciousness and its importance in cognitive theorizing. Section 1 critically examines some proposed definitions of consciousness, and argues that the folk- psychological notion of phenomenal consciousness is not captured by various functional-relational definitions. Section 2 rebuts the arguments of several writers who challenge the very existence of phenomenal consciousness, or the coherence or tenability of the folk-psychological notion of awareness. Section 3 defends a significant role for phenomenal consciousness in the execution of a certain cognitive task, viz., classification of one's own mental states. Execution of this task, which is part of folk psychologizing, is taken as a datum in scientific psychology. It is then argued that the most promising sort of scientific model of the self-ascription of mental states is one that posits the kinds of phenomenal properties invoked by folk psychology. Cognitive science and neuroscience can of course refine and improve upon the folk understanding of consciousness, awareness, and mental states generally. But the folk-psychological constructs should not be jettisoned; they have a role to play in cognitive theorizing
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience.Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):299-327.
Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Naturalizing Subjective Character.Uriah Kriegel - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
Quotational Higher-Order Thought Theory.Sam Coleman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.
Two HOTS to Handle: The Concept of State Consciousness in the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Jennifer Matey - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):151-175.
Similar books and articles
Why Cognitive Science is Not Formalized Folk Psychology.Martin J. Pickering & Nick Chater - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (3):309-337.
Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture.Frances Egan - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96.
Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects.Adam Arico - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):371-393.
The Irrelevance of Folk Intuitions to the “Hard Problem” of Consciousness.Brian Talbot - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):644-650.
Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness.Justin Sytsma - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):700-711.
Dennetts Theory of the Folk Theory of Consciousness.Justin Sytsma - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):3-4.
Commonsense Concepts of Phenomenal Consciousness: Does Anyone Care About Functional Zombies?Bryce Huebner - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):133-155.
Dennett's Theory of the Folk Theory of Consciousness.Justin Sytsma - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):107-130.
Folk Psychology.Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 35-71.
Folk Psychology.Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich - 1994 - Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science:235--255.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads151 ( #29,993 of 2,153,826 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #184,516 of 2,153,826 )
How can I increase my downloads?