Episteme 7 (2):138-150 (2010)

Sanford Goldberg
Northwestern University
Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice is a wide-ranging and important book on a much-neglected topic: the injustice involved in cases in which distrust arises out of prejudice. Fricker has some important things to say about this sort of injustice: its nature, how it arises, what sustains it, and the unhappy outcomes associated with it for the victim and the society in which it takes place. In the course of developing this account, Fricker also develops an account of the epistemology of testimony. Focusing my attention on that account, my central claims are two. First, at least some of Fricker's arguments against existing (inferentialist and non-inferentialist) views in the epistemology of testimony are less than fully persuasive, and the (non-inferentialist) view she ends up endorsing is not all that different from the views she criticizes. Second, her reasons for harboring doubts regarding the role of a principle of default entitlement within a non-inferentialist account are not persuasive. Neither of these claims affects the overall argument Fricker is trying to run. Rather, they suggest that Fricker may have picked more fights than she needed to in the epistemology of testimony. If so, we have reason to detach Fricker's important work on epistemic injustice from some of the details of the story she tells regarding the epistemology of testimony
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DOI 10.3366/epi.2010.0004
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References found in this work BETA

Testimony: A Philosophical Study.C. A. J. Coady - 1992 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2000 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

What Makes Epistemic Injustice an “Injustice”?Morten Fibieger Byskov - 2021 - Journal of Social Philosophy 52 (1):114-131.
Epistemic injustice in Climate Adaptation.Morten Fibieger Byskov & Keith Hyams - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-22.
Bots: Some Less-Considered Epistemic Problems.Benjamin Winokur - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-13.

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Précis.Miranda Fricker - 2008 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 23 (1):69-71.
Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice.David Coady - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):101-113.
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