Authors
Sanford Goldberg
Northwestern University
Abstract
ABSTRACT In this paper I argue that there are possible cases in which the demands of justice and the norms of epistemology cannot be simultaneously satisfied. I will bring out these normative clashes in terms of the now-familiar phenomenon of testimonial injustice. While the resulting argument is very much in the spirit of two other sorts of argument that have received sustained attention recently – arguments alleging epistemic partiality in friendship, and arguments that motivate the hypothesis of moral encroachment on the epistemic – I suggest how the argument from epistemic injustice differs from, and is stronger than, both of those arguments. The implications of the present argument are several: we must reconceive the role of identity-prejudice in testimonial injustice, modify the way we think about how justice and epistemology bear on testimonial transactions, and understand the mutuality of speech exchanges in ways that do not privilege any particular participant’s epistemic perspective.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2022
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1080/09672559.2021.1997391
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,979
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.
Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 181-205.

View all 51 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Testimonial Injustice in International Criminal Law.Shannon Fyfe - 2018 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2):155-171.
Testimonial Injustice Without Credibility Deficit.Federico Luzzi - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):203-211.
Anonymity and Testimonial Warrant.David Matheson - 2004 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 8 (2):213-231.
Pejoratives and Testimonial Injustice.Julija Perhat - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):145-154.
Bystander Omissions and Accountability for Testimonial Injustice.J. Y. Lee - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):519-536.
Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust.Gloria Origgi - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (2):221-235.
The Expansionist View of Systematic Testimonial Injustice: South Asian Context.Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda - 2019 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 6 (2):171-181.
Testimonial Injustice and Speakers’ Duties.Kristin Voigt - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (4):402-420.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2022-01-10

Total views
12 ( #808,968 of 2,505,145 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #63,925 of 2,505,145 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes