Authors
Sanford Goldberg
Northwestern University
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to defend a novel characterization of epistemic luck. Helping myself to the notions of epistemic entitlement and adequate explanation, I propose that a true belief suffers from epistemic luck iff an adequate explanation of the fact that the belief acquired is true must appeal to propositions to which the subject herself is not epistemically entitled. The burden of the argument is to show that there is a plausible construal of the notions of epistemic entitlement and adequate explanation on which the resulting characterization of epistemic luck, though admittedly programmatic, has several important virtues. It avoids difficulties which plague modal accounts of epistemic luck; it can explain the conflicting temptations one can feel in certain alleged cases of epistemic luck; it offers a novel account of the value of knowledge, without committing itself to any particular analysis of knowledge; and it illuminates the significance for epistemology of the phenomenon of epistemic luck itself
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DOI 10.1111/phpr.12083
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Theory of Knowledge.Roderick Milton Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.

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Citations of this work BETA

Saving safety from counterexamples.Thomas Grundmann - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5161-5185.
A Problem for Moral Luck.Steven D. Hales - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2385-2403.
Against global method safety.Sven Bernecker - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5101-5116.

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