Philosophers' Imprint (forthcoming)

Authors
Simon Goldstein
Australian Catholic University
Abstract
Triviality results threaten plausible principles governing our credence in epistemic modal claims. This paper develops a new account of modal credence which avoids triviality. On the resulting theory, probabilities are assigned not to sets of worlds, but rather to sets of information state-world pairs. The theory avoids triviality by giving up the principle that rational credence is closed under conditionalization. A rational agent can become irrational by conditionalizing on new evidence. In place of conditionalization, the paper develops a new account of updating: conditionalization with normalization.
Keywords Epistemic modals  Formal epistemology  Dynamic semantics
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