Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):411-438 (2004)

Authors
Nathaniel Goldberg
Washington and Lee University
Abstract
The idea that there are conceptual schemes, relative to which we conceptualize experience, and empirical content, the “raw” data of experience that get conceptualized through our conceptual schemes into beliefs or sentences, is not new. The idea that there are neither conceptual schemes nor empirical content, however, is. Moreover, it is so new, that only four arguments have so far been given against this dualism, with Donald Davidson himself presenting versions of all four. In this paper, I show that in both the general and Davidson’s specific form the first three arguments against scheme-content dualism rely on the fourth. From many there is just one. Then I show that the fate of the first three arguments against scheme-content dualism hangs on that of the fourth. Finally I present four reasons why the fourth argument fails. For the sake of the dualism’s detractors, therefore, one can only hope that forthcoming arguments against scheme-content dualism fare better than those given so far.
Keywords Davidson, Donald  Kant, Immanuel  conceptual scheme  empirical content  scheme/content dualism  incommensurability  Kuhn, Thomas
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ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2004.tb01001.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

On Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Schemes and Conceptual Relativism.Xinli Wang - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):140-164.
Tension Within Triangulation.Nathaniel Goldberg - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):363-383.
Historicism, Entrenchment, and Conventionalism.Nathaniel Jason Goldberg - 2009 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (2):259-276.

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