Emotion, reason and virtue

In Dylan Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press (2004)
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original Goldie, Peter (2004) "Emotion, reason and virtue". In Evans, Dylan, Cruse, Pierre, Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality, pp. 249--267: Oxford University Press (2004)

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Peter Goldie
Manchester

Citations of this work

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Epistemic perceptualism and neo-sentimentalist objections.Robert Cowan - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):59-81.

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