Generalized Update Semantics

Mind 128 (511):795-835 (2019)
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Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between dynamic and truth conditional semantics for epistemic modals. It provides a generalization of a standard dynamic update semantics for modals. This new semantics derives a Kripke semantics for modals and a standard dynamic semantics for modals as special cases. The semantics allows for new characterizations of a variety of principles in modal logic, including the inconsistency of ‘p and might not p’. Finally, the semantics provides a construction procedure for transforming any truth conditional semantics for modals into a dynamic semantics for modals with similar properties.

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Simon Goldstein
Australian Catholic University

Citations of this work

Dynamic Non-Classicality.Matthew Mandelkern - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):382-392.
The Dynamics of Argumentative Discourse.Carlotta Pavese & Alexander W. Kocurek - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (2):413-456.
A Strictly Stronger Relative Must.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):82-89.
Conditional Collapse.Sam Carter - forthcoming - Mind.
Does Chance Undermine Would?Alexander W. Kocurek - 2022 - Mind 131 (523):747-785.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.

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