Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis refuted


Authors
Irwin Goldstein
Davidson College
Abstract
Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
Keywords Causation  Epistemology  Experience  Functionalism  Mental States
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DOI 10.1080/00048409412345871
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.R. Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Dover Publications.
Mind, Language, and Reality.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and A Posteriori Identities.Irwin Goldstein - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):261-273.

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