Legal Theory 1 (4):439-464 (1995)

In his recent book Interpretation and Legal Theory , Andrei Marmor makes a number of claims about meaning and interpretation, both in general and in law, which I will argue are mistaken. Actually, there is some confusion in his book between what I take to be his “official” view of the nature of meaning and interpretation, and a very different view which keeps surfacing despite his official rejection of it. I will argue that this alternative, rejected view, when properly developed, is more plausible than his official view, and that the difference between them is of considerable practical consequence for legal interpretation. What is at stake is the role of legislative intention. The alternative view denies Marmor's claim that the meaning of a statute is conceptually independent of the intention or purpose which the legislature had in enacting it. It should be said at the outset that I will focus on just three of the eight chapters in Marmor's book, which contains many virtues that are untouched by my critique
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DOI 10.1017/s1352325200000203
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References found in this work BETA

Intention and Interpretation: A Last Look.Jerrold Levinson - 1992 - In Gary Iseminger (ed.), Intention and Interpretation. Temple University Press. pp. 221--56.
On What a Text is and How It Means.William E. Tolhurst - 1979 - British Journal of Aesthetics 19 (1):3-14.
Literal Meaning and Logical Theory.Jerrold J. Katz - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):203-233.

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