Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):261-273 (2004)
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| Keywords | Contemporary Philosophy General Interest |
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| ISBN(s) | 0045-5091 |
| DOI | cjphil200434Supplement63 |
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References found in this work BETA
Identity and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1971 - In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University Press. pp. 135-164.
Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional Intrinsic Values.Irwin Goldstein - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276.
Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States.Irwin Goldstein - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (291):89-104.
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