On the Metainferential Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes

Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (3):797-820 (2023)
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Abstract

Substructural solutions to the semantic paradoxes have been broadly discussed in recent years. In particular, according to the non-transitive solution, we have to give up the metarule of Cut, whose role is to guarantee that the consequence relation is transitive. This concession—giving up a meta rule—allows us to maintain the entire consequence relation of classical logic. The non-transitive solution has been generalized in recent works into a hierarchy of logics where classicality is maintained at more and more metainferential levels. All the logics in this hierarchy can accommodate a truth predicate, including the logic at the top of the hierarchy—known as CMω—which presumably maintains classicality at all levels. CMω has so far been accounted for exclusively in model-theoretic terms. Therefore, there remains an open question: how do we account for this logic in proof-theoretic terms? Can there be found a proof system that admits each and every classical principle—at all inferential levels—but nevertheless blocks the derivation of the liar? In the present paper, I solve this problem by providing such a proof system and establishing soundness and completeness results. Yet, I also argue that the outcome is philosophically unsatisfactory. In fact, I’m afraid that in light of my results this metainferential solution to the paradoxes can hardly be called a “solution,” let alone a good one.

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Author's Profile

Rea Golan
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Citations of this work

The logics of a universal language.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio & Edson Bezerra - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-22.

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Paradoxes and Failures of Cut.David Ripley - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):139 - 164.

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