Grazer Philosophische Studien 45:105-116 (1993)
Propositions - truths and falsehoods - are "eternal" objects of possible ("de dicto") belief and disbelief, potential points of agreement and disagreement. Accordingly the criterion of two sentence-tokens "expressing tiie same proposition" will be tiie logical impossibility of beheving (disbelieving) what one expresses without believing (disbelieving) what the other expresses. This involves an ultra-thight synonymity relation ("semantic equivalence") and a sharing of denotations as between corresponding Unguistic expressions in each. Only locutions containing names, indexicals, etc. which commit speakers to the same purported existents can "express the same proposition", but Stephen Schiffer is wrong to argue that saying one believes such a proposition necessarily imputes any metalinguistic conceptions to one. Propositions lack simplicity-or-complexity and hence structure (because sometimes a conjunction is one of its conjuncts). Each true (false) proposition has "its own" fact which it asserts (denies)
Keywords Analytic Philosophy
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DOI 10.5840/gps19934520
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