Philosophical intuitions: Their target, their source, and their epistemic status

Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):1-26 (2007)

Authors
Alvin Goldman
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Intuitions play a critical role in analytical philosophical activity. But do they qualify as genuine evidence for the sorts of conclusions philosophers seek? Skeptical arguments against intuitions are reviewed, and a variety of ways of trying to legitimate them are considered. A defense is offered of their evidential status by showing how their evidential status can be embedded in a naturalistic framework.
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DOI 10.1163/9789401204651_002
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