In Michael Depaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield (1998)

Joel Pust
University of Delaware
Alvin Goldman
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
How can intuitions be used to validate or invalidate a philosophical theory? An intuition about a case seems to be a basic evidential source for the truth of that intuition, i.e., for the truth of the claim that a particular example is or isn’t an instance of a philosophically interesting kind, concept, or predicate. A mental‐state type is a basic evidential source only if its tokens reliably indicate the truth of their contents. The best way to account for intuitions being a basic evidential source is to interpret their subject matter in psychologistic terms. Intuitions provide evidence about the contents of the intuiter's concept, where “concept” is understood as a psychological structure.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,229
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.
The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience.Selim Berker - 2009 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (4):293-329.
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.

View all 80 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Role of Theory Contamination in Intuitions.James Mcbain - 1999 - Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):197-204.
Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics.Matthew S. Bedke - 1069-1083 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083.
Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology.Alvin I. Goldman - forthcoming - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association.
Probability, Credibility and Acceptability.Richard G. Swinburne - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (3):275 - 283.
Prediction and Prejudice.Peter Lipton - 1990 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (1):51 – 65.
Simulation and Reason Explanation: The Radical View.Robert M. Gordon - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1-2):175-192.
The Intuitional Tendency in the Scholastic Approach.Hunter Guthrie - 1938 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 14:144-151.
Foundations of Evidence Law.Alex Stein - 2005 - Oxford University Press.


Added to PP index

Total views
267 ( #36,535 of 2,455,424 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #225,815 of 2,455,424 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes