Reasoning and grasping objects

European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):699-711 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX


There is a pervasive view that inference—as opposed, notably, to a grasp of objects—is an intralinguistic process that does not draw on extralinguistic resources. The present paper aims to show that this dichotomy between inferring and grasping objects can be resisted. Specifically, I offer an alternative view: a phenomenological account according to which our most basic inferences draw on our grasp of objects. I motivate this account on the grounds that, although it is restricted to such basic inferences, it has significant implications for the general question of whether inference involves taking one's premises to support one's conclusion. The proposed account implies that basic inferences need not involve corresponding “takings,” (even though such inferences involve conceptual content), but it leaves open the possibility that non-basic inferences do involve corresponding “takings,” while relying on basic inferences. It will turn out that such a disjunctive view, according to which non-basic reasoning is somewhat parasitic on basic reasoning, manages to avoid many of the problems with which the literature on the “taking condition” deals.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):285-318.
Some Reflections on Seeing-as, Metaphor-Grasping and Imagining.Kathleen Stock - 2013 - Aisthesis: Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 6 (1):201-213.
7. grasping, understanding, and interpreting.Laurent Stern - 2005 - In Interpretive reasoning. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. pp. 127-146.
Future-oriented objects.Brandon W. Goulding & Ori Friedman - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
The Theaetetus on how we Think.David Barton - 1999 - Phronesis 44 (3):163-180.
Three Questions about Treatise 1.4.2.Georges Dicker - 2007 - Hume Studies 33 (1):115-153.
Grasping objects and contents.Reinaldo Elugardo & Robert J. Stainton - 2003 - In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 257-302.
The "Theaetetus" on How We Think.David Barton - 1999 - Phronesis 44 (3):163 - 180.


Added to PP

71 (#226,531)

6 months
10 (#251,846)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Rea Golan
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):661-688.
From Empiricism to Expressivism.Robert Brandom - 2015 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references