Recursive tracking versus process reliabilism [Book Review]

Abstract
Sherrilyn Roush’s Tracking Truth (2005) is an impressive, precisioncrafted work. Although it sets out to rehabilitate the epistemological theory of Robert Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations (1981), its departures from Nozick’s line are extensive and original enough that it should be regarded as a distinct form of epistemological externalism. Roush’s mission is to develop an externalism that averts the problems and counterexamples encountered not only by Nozick’s theory but by other varieties of externalism as well. Roush advances both a theory of knowledge and a theory of evidence; I focus entirely on knowledge. I shall pinpoint a few respects in which Roush’s theory is not wholly successful. In particular, it works less well than process- (or method-) oriented externalisms like process reliabilism. Nozick’s initial tracking account of knowledge was formulated as follows
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00274.x
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Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Reliabilism.Alvin Goldman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Defending the Tracking Theories of Knowledge.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:3-8.
Review: Review Article: Evidence and Leverage: Comment on Roush. [REVIEW]Eric Christian Barnes - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):549 - 557.
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2009-06-28

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