Southwest Philosophy Review 36 (1):45-54 (2020)

Authors
Jonah Goldwater
College of William and Mary
Abstract
Opponents of ‘ought implies can’ (OIC) often proceed via cases or counterexamples; hypothetical situations are described in which one is unable to do what one intuitively ought to do. I proceed differently. I offer six arguments against OIC via general principles; no cases. Though each argument would suffice to refute OIC if sound, redundancy is always a failsafe.
Keywords ought implies can  method of cases  moral perfection
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DOI 10.5840/swphilreview20203616
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