Stakes, Practical Adequacy, and the Epistemic Significance of Double-Checking

Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6 (2019)
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In their chapter “Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes,” Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne present several challenges to the doctrine of pragmatic encroachment. In this brief reply to their chapter two things are aimed at. First, the chapter argues that there is a sense in which their case against pragmatic encroachment is a bit weaker, and another sense in which that case is much stronger, than Anderson and Hawthorne’s own argument would suggest. Second, the chapter highlights and then builds upon their extremely interesting reflections on one sort of practical matter that has not received proper attention in the literature: the epistemic significance of double-checking. This is done with an eye towards pointing in the direction of further work.



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Sanford Goldberg
Northwestern University

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Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.

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