Testimony as Evidence

Philosophica 78 (2006)

Authors
Sanford Goldberg
Northwestern University
Abstract
Regarding testimony as evidence fails to predict the sort of epistemic support testimony provides for testimonial belief. As a result, testimony-based belief should not be assimilated into the category of epistemically inferential, evidence-based belief.
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References found in this work BETA

Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
The Social Character of Testimonial Knowledge.Paul Faulkner - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):581-601.
Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimonial Knowledge.Sanford Goldberg - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. pp. 127--44.
Testimonial Justification and Transindividual Reasons.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. pp. 193--224.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Division of Epistemic Labor.Sandy Goldberg - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):112-125.
Communication Between Friends.Dan O'Brien - 2009 - Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication 1 (1):27-41.

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