Towards a New Account of Progress in Metaphysics: The Tool Building Approach

Abstract

How does scientifically informed metaphysics make progress? One response is that scientifically informed metaphysics makes progress off the back of science. Some argue that there is a problem with this line of reasoning. Kerry McKenzie claims that metaphysics cannot make progress off the back of science because metaphysical theories cannot approximate the truth like science can. She concludes that metaphysics based on science cannot make progress, even in principle. In this paper, I use McKenzie’s argument as a jumping-off point from which to make two claims. First, I claim that metaphysics is capable of making progress on a known account of scientific progress, the truthlikeness account. Second, I present the groundwork for a new account of metaphysical progress, which I call the ‘Tool Building Approach’.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

How to Make Real, Constructive, Progress in Medicine.Jeremy R. Simon - 2011 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 17 (5):847-851.
Non‐Naturalistic Metaphysics.Hud Hudson - 2016 - In Kelly James Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 168–181.
A New Functional Approach to Scientific Progress.Yafeng Shan - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (4):739-758.
Moral Progress: Between Justification and Innovation.Philippe Brunozzi - 2019 - Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy 2019 (4):295-313.
Moral Progress: Between Justification and Innovation.Philippe Brunozzi - 2020 - Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy 4 (1):295-313.
Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism.Larry Laudan - 1987 - American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1):19 - 31.
Legend naturalism and scientific progress: An essay on Philip Kitcher's.Miriam Solomon - 1995 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (2):205-218.
Things in Progress.Zoltan Szabo - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):499-525.
The Moral Realism of Pragmatic Naturalism.William Rottschaefer - 2012 - Analyse & Kritik 34 (1):141-156.
Justifying Scientific Progress.Jacob Stegenga - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-02-10

Downloads
80 (#198,934)

6 months
80 (#50,981)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized.James Ladyman & Don Ross - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Don Ross, David Spurrett & John G. Collier.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
The Tools of Metaphysics and the Metaphysics of Science.Theodore Sider - 2020 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.

View all 27 references / Add more references