Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6):65-88 (2019)

Jonah Goldwater
College of William and Mary
I argue physicalism should be characterized as the thesis that all behavior is law-governed. This characterization captures crucial desiderata for a formulation of physicalism, including its broad import and worldview defining features. It also has more local virtues, such as avoiding Hempel’s dilemma. A particularly important implication, I argue, is that this thesis makes the question of the mind’s physicality turn on what the mind can do- rather than what experience is like.
Keywords physicalism  laws of nature  consciousness  free will  qualitative experience
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