Dialogue 43 (4):671-683 (2004)

Authors
Nathaniel Goldberg
Washington and Lee University
Abstract
The recent publication of a third anthology of Donald Davidson’s articles, and anticipated publication of two more, encourages a consideration of themes binding together Davidson’s lifetime of research. One such theme is the principle of charity (PC). In light of the mileage Davidson gets out of PC, I propose a careful examination of PC itself. In Part 1, I consider some ways in which Davidson articulates PC. In Part 2, I show that the articulation that Davidson requires in his work on epistemology is untenable given what Davidson says in his work on semanties. I conclude that Davidson can use PC only in his work on semantics or not at all.La parution récente du troisième recueil d’articles de Donald Davidson, lequel devrait être suivi de deux autres, incite à examiner les thèmes qui traversent tous ses travaux. Parmi ces thèmes se trouve le principe de charité (PC). Considérant tout le parti que Davidson a tiré du PC, je me propose d’en faire un examen attentif. Dans la première partie, j’examine diverses formulations du PC par Davidson. Dansla seconde partie, je montre que la formulation qu’exigent ses travaux d’épistémologie est intenable étant donné ce qu’ll en dit dans ses travaux de sémantique. De là, je conclus que Davidson ne peut se servir du PC que dans ses travaux de sémantique ou pas du tout
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0012-2173
DOI 10.1017/s001221730000398x
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References found in this work BETA

Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.). Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
Problems of Rationality.Donald Davidson - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
The Structure and Content of Truth.Donald Davidson - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (6):279-328.

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Tension Within Triangulation.Nathaniel Goldberg - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):363-383.

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