Team Reasoning, Framing and Self-Control: An Aristotelian Account

In Neil Levy (ed.), Addiction and Self-Control: Perspectives From Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience. New York, US: Oup Usa (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Decision theory explains weakness of will as the result of a conflict of incentives between different transient agents. In this framework, self-control can only be achieved by the I-now altering the incentives or choice-sets of future selves. There is no role for an extended agency over time. However, it is possible to extend game theory to allow multiple levels of agency. At the inter-personal level, theories of team reasoning allow teams to be agents, as well as individuals. I apply team reasoning at the intra-personal level, taking the self as a team of transient agents over time. This allows agents to ask, not just “what should I-now do?’, but also ‘What should I, the person over time do?’, which may enable agents to achieve self-control. The resulting account is Aristotelian in flavour, as it involves reasoning schemata and perception, and it is compatible with some of the psychological findings about self-control.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Theories of team agency.Robert Sugden & Natalie Gold - 2007 - In Fabienne Peter (ed.), rationality and commitment. Oxford University Press USA.
A Critique of Alfred R Mele’s Work on Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. [REVIEW]Pujarini Das - 2018 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Springer India:1995.
The skill of self-control.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6251-6273.
Why should we team reason?Katharine Browne - 2018 - Economics and Philosophy 34 (2):185-198.
Framing Joint Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.
From self-regarding to other-regarding agents in strategic games: a logical analysis.Emiliano Lorini - 2011 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 21 (3-4):443-475.
Cooperation, fairness and team reasoning.Hein Duijf - 2021 - Economics and Philosophy 37 (3):413-440.
Competition among procrastinators.Takeharu Sogo - 2019 - Theory and Decision 86 (3-4):325-337.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-05-14

Downloads
1,265 (#11,298)

6 months
142 (#39,450)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Natalie Gold
London School of Economics

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
A plea for excuses.J. L. Austin - 1964 - In Vere Claiborne Chappell (ed.), Ordinary language: essays in philosophical method. New York: Dover Publications. pp. 1--30.

View all 22 references / Add more references