Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):118-138 (2006)

Authors
Sanford Goldberg
Northwestern University
Abstract
Many people agree that a proper epistemological treatment of testimonial knowledge will regard testimonial warrant—the total truth-conducive support enjoyed by a belief grounded on a piece of testimony —as socially diffuse, in the sense that it is not something that supervenes on the proper functionality of the hearer’s cognitive resources together with the reasons she has for accepting the testimony. After arguing for such a view, I go on to identify a challenge many people think flows from an acknowledgment of the social diffusion of warrant. In particular, such an acknowledgment appears to preclude a happy account of the rationality of testimony-based belief. After identifying the nature of this challenge and the various positions that one can take on it, I develop a response according to which rationality itself (like warrant) is socially diffuse
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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Reprint years 2006
ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2006.tb00034.x
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References found in this work BETA

Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1999 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.
Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Dependence in Testimonial Belief, in the Classroom and Beyond.Sanford Goldberg - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2):168-186.
The Epistemology of Testimonal Trust.Jesper Kallestrup - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):150-174.

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