Uploads, Faxes, and You: Can Personal Identity Be Transmitted?

American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (3):233–250 (2021)
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Abstract

Abstract. Could a person or mind be uploaded—transmitted to a computer or network—and thereby survive bodily death? I argue ‘mind uploading’ is possible only if a mind is an abstract object rather than a concrete particular. Two implications are notable. One, if someone can be uploaded someone can be multiply-instantiated, such that there could be as many instances of a person as copies of a book. Second, mind uploading’s possibility is incompatible with the leading theories of personal identity, insofar as these assume the mind is a concrete particular. Moreover, because David Chalmers (2010; 2012; 2014) defends mind uploading without construing minds as abstract, I show Chalmers’ argument to be unsound.

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Jonah Goldwater
William & Mary

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References found in this work

The singularity: A philosophical analysis.David J. Chalmers - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):9 - 10.
Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
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What are we?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.
A history of transhumanist thought.Nick Bostrom - 2005 - Journal of Evolution and Technology 14 (1):1-25.

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