Why inconsistent intentional states underlie our grasp of objects

Southern Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Several authors maintain that we are capable of having inconsistent intentional states, either in cases of illusion, in certain cases of imagination, or because the observable world is (partly) inconsistent and we perceive it as such. These views are all premised on the assumption that inconsistent intentional states—even if acknowledged—are peculiar and have nothing essential to do with our perceptual capacities. In the present article, I would like to present, and argue for, a much stronger thesis: that inconsistent intentional states underlie the possibility of having intentional content in mind. I argue for this thesis based on a Husserlian phenomenological analysis of our grasp of objects, which I formulate in terms of incompatibility semantics.

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Rea Golan
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

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References found in this work

Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy.Edmund Husserl - 1980 - Hingham, MA, USA: Distributors for the U.S. and Canada, Kluwer Boston.
Cartesian meditations.Edmund Husserl - 1960 - [The Hague]: M. Nijhoff.
Experience and judgment: investigations in a genealogy of logic.Edmund Husserl - 1973 - London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Edited by Ludwig Landgrebe.
Negation on the Australian Plan.Francesco Berto & Greg Restall - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (6):1119-1144.

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