What is Justified Belief?

In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25 (1979)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of justified belief. What I have in mind is an explanatory theory, one that explains in a general way why certain beliefs are counted as justified and others as unjustified. Unlike some traditional approaches, I do not try to prescribe standards for justification that differ from, or improve upon, our ordinary standards. I merely try to explicate the ordinary standards, which are, I believe, quite different from those of many classical, e. g., ‘Cartesian’, accounts.

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Alvin Goldman
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton University
Radical Externalism.Amia Srinivasan - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):395-431.
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.

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