Are necessary and sufficient conditions converse relations?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):375 – 387 (2009)
Abstract
Claims that necessary and sufficient conditions are not converse relations are discussed, as well as the related claim that If A, then B is not equivalent to A only if B . The analysis of alleged counterexamples has shown, among other things, how necessary and sufficient conditions should be understood, especially in the case of causal conditions, and the importance of distinguishing sufficient-cause conditionals from necessary-cause conditionals. It is concluded that necessary and sufficient conditions, adequately interpreted, are converse relations in all cases.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802587325
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References found in this work BETA
The Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1938 - Journal of Philosophy 35 (7):191-192.
Beth Too, but Only If.Achille C. Varzi - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):224-229.

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