Kantian Review 15 (2):118-137 (2010)
AbstractJames Van Cleve has argued that Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the categories shows, at most, that we must apply the categories to experience. And this falls short of Kant’s aim, which is to show that they must so apply. In this discussion I argue that once we have noted the differences between the first and second editions of the Deduction, this objection is less telling. But Van Cleve’s objection can help illuminate the structure of the B Deduction, and it suggests an interesting reason why the rewriting might have been thought necessary.
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Citations of this work
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Kant and the Pre-Conceptual Use of the Understanding.Jonas Jervell Indregard - 2021 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 103 (1):93-119.
Kant on the Original Synthesis of Understanding and Sensibility.Jessica J. Williams - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (1):66-86.
References found in this work
Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1781/1998 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell. pp. 449-451.
Critique of Pure Reason.Wolfgang Schwarz - 1966 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (3):449-451.
Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason.Béatrice Longuenesse - 1998 - Princeton University Press.
Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense.Henry E. Allison - 2004 - Yale University Press.