In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2021)

Authors
Anil Gomes
Oxford University
Matthew Parrott
King's College London
Abstract
Internalism and externalism disagree about whether agents who are internally the same can differ in their mental states. But what is it for two agents to be internally the same? Standard formulations take agents to be internally the same in virtue of some metaphysical fact, for example, that they share intrinsic physical properties. Our aim in this chapter is to argue that such formulations should be rejected. We provide the outlines of an alternative formulation on which agents are internally the same in virtue of facts about their epistemic capacities. The resulting formulation is one on which internalism and externalism are views about the extent to which an agent’s mental states can vary independently of the capacity for introspective discrimination. We suggest that this epistemic formulation of internalism and externalism picks out a substantive disagreement in philosophical theorizing about the nature of the mind.
Keywords Internalism  Externalism  Indiscriminability  Nature of the Mind  Introspection
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hillary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.

View all 46 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content.Keith Butler - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800.
Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content.Keith Butler - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800.
Phenomenal Character, Phenomenal Concepts, and Externalism.Jonathan Ellis - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.
Internalism and Externalism in Speech Act Theory.Robert Harnish - 2009 - Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 5 (1):9-31.
Internalism and Externalism.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge. pp. 283-295.
Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism.Ernest Sosa - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2022-05-11

Total views
47 ( #240,694 of 2,504,828 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
47 ( #18,558 of 2,504,828 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes