Response to LÖhr: Why We Still Need a New Normativism

Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1067-1076 (2023)
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Guido Löhr's recent article makes several insightful and productive suggestions about how to proceed with the empirical study of collective action. However, their critique of the conclusions drawn in Gomez-Lavin & Rachar (2022) is undermined by some issues with the interpretation of the debate and paper. This discussion article clears up those issues, presents new findings from experiments developed in response to Löhr's critiques, reflects on the role of experimental research in the development and refinement of philosophical theories, and adds to Löhr's suggestions about the path forward.

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Author Profiles

Javier Gomez-Lavin
Purdue University
Matthew Rachar
Freie Universität Berlin

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References found in this work

The Confounding Question of Confounding Causes in Randomized Trials.Jonathan Fuller - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):901-926.
Normativity in joint action.Javier Gomez-Lavin & Matthew Rachar - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (1):97-120.
Quasi-Psychologism about Collective Intention.Matthew Rachar - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):475-488.

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