Still Particular: A Reply to Ganson and Mehta

Abstract

We are grateful to Ganson and Mehta (forthcoming) for their reply to our defence of phenomenal particularism against the objections raised by Mehta in his (2014). Their reply clarifies the nature of their objections to phenomenal particularism and helps identify the locus of our disagreements. In what follows we aim to defend phenomenal particularism against the objections raised in their reply.

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Author Profiles

Craig French
Nottingham University
Anil Gomes
University of Oxford

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References found in this work

The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action.Matthew Soteriou - 2013 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
The limits of self-awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge.John McDowell - 1988 - In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 455-79.
Consciousness and Reference.John Campbell - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.

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