Still Particular: A Reply to Ganson and Mehta

Authors
Anil Gomes
Oxford University
Craig French
Nottingham University
Abstract
We are grateful to Ganson and Mehta (forthcoming) for their reply to our defence of phenomenal particularism against the objections raised by Mehta in his (2014). Their reply clarifies the nature of their objections to phenomenal particularism and helps identify the locus of our disagreements. In what follows we aim to defend phenomenal particularism against the objections raised in their reply.
Keywords Perception  Particularity of Perception  Naive Realism  Phenomenal Particularism  Phenomenal Generalism  Phenomenal Character
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