Revista de Filosofía 63:37-53 (2007)

Authors
Rodrigo González
University of Chile
Abstract
Este artículo analiza el Test de Turing, uno de los métodos más famosos y controvertidos para evaluar la existencia de vida mental en la Filosofía de la Mente, revelando dos mitos filosóficos comúnmente aceptados y criticando su dogma. En primer lugar, se muestra por qué Turing nunca propuso una definición de inteligencia. En segundo lugar, se refuta que el Test de Turing involucre condiciones necesarias o suficientes para la inteligencia. En tercer lugar, teniendo presente el objetivo y el tipo de evidencia que recopila, se considera si el Test de Turing cuenta como un experimento científico a la luz de la concepción de Fodor. Finalmente, se argumenta que Turing simpatiza con una forma de Conductismo, confundiendo la simulación -un proceso epistémico que, gobernado por la verosimilitud, es eficaz cuando alguien es causado a creer que el computador es inteligente- con la duplicación de la inteligencia en cuanto propiedad, lo que ocurre a nivel ontológico. Tal confusión implica un dogma y explica por qué, a pesar de haber sido propuesto como una solución final a la problemática de si las máquinas programadas piensan, el Test de Turing ha tenido precisamente el efecto contrario en más de cinco décadas, estimulando el debate filosófico en torno a la naturaleza de lo mental.Debunking two commonly held myths and fleshing out its dogma, this article deals with the Turing Test, one of the most famous and controversial methods to assess the existence of mental life in the Philosophy of Mind. Firstly, I show why Turing never gave a definition of intelligence. Secondly, I dispute claims that the Turing Test provides a necessary or sufficient condition of intelligence. Thirdly, in view of its aim and the sort of evidence it offers, I consider whether or not Turing's test can be regarded as a scientific experiment in light of Fodor's theory. Finally, I argue that Turing is committed to a form of behaviourism and, further, confuses simulation -an epistemic process which, being governed by verisimilitude, is successful when someone is caused to believe that the computer is intelligent-with the duplication of intelligence qua property, which takes place at an ontological level. This confusion involves a dogma and explains why, despite being devised as the final solution to the dilemma of whether or not programmed machines think, the Turing Test has precisely had the opposite effect for longer than five decades, stimulating the philosophical discussion on the nature of mind.
Keywords Test de Turing  Inteligencia  Simulación  Duplicación
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